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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/575,474	04/12/2006	Hiroko Kojima	062405	3422
38834	7590	02/26/2008	EXAMINER	
WESTERMAN, HATTORI, DANIELS & ADRIAN, LLP			SHEN, WU CHENG WINSTON	
1250 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NW			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
SUITE 700			1632	
WASHINGTON, DC 20036				
MAIL DATE		DELIVERY MODE		
02/26/2008		PAPER		

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

<b>Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief</b>	<b>Application No.</b> 10/575,474	<b>Applicant(s)</b> KOJIMA ET AL.
	<b>Examiner</b> WU-CHENG Winston SHEN	<b>Art Unit</b> 1632

**--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**

**THE REPLY FILED 25 January 2008 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.**

1.  The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on the same day as filing a Notice of Appeal. To avoid abandonment of this application, applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit, or other evidence, which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply must be filed within one of the following time periods:

- a)  The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
 b)  The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
 Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**NOTICE OF APPEAL**

2.  The Notice of Appeal was filed on \_\_\_\_\_. A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.37(a).

**AMENDMENTS**

3.  The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because  
 (a)  They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);  
 (b)  They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below);  
 (c)  They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or  
 (d)  They present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_. (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).

4.  The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324).

5.  Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): The rejection of claims 9-12 under 102(e) and 102(a) being anticipated by Kunita et al., is withdrawn in light of Applicant's arguments, which are found persuasive.

6.  Newly proposed or amended claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).

7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a)  will not be entered, or b)  will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) objected to: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) rejected: 9-12

Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: \_\_\_\_\_.

**AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE**

8.  The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but before or on the date of filing a Notice of Appeal will not be entered because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the affidavit or other evidence is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).

9.  The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome all rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).

10.  The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached.

**REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER**

11.  The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:  
See Continuation Sheet.

12.  Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.

13.  Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

/Valarie Bertoglio/  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1632

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:  
Applicant's arguments have failed to overcome the rejection of claims 9-12 under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) and under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) as being anticipated by Doll et al. (Doll et al., U.S. Patent application Publication 2003/0235564, publication date Dec. 25, 2003, filed on May 13, 2003).

Applicant argues that Doll does not inherently disclose an implant including the claimed adsorption. Doll does not explicitly describe how Runx2 is incorporated into a porous material. Applicant also argues that specific procedures must be undertaken in order to ensure adsorption. Applicant further cites the disclosure on pages 7, 11, and 16, which indicates that a degassed condition under a reduced pressure of 100 to 150 mmHg for 3 hours or longer is required for the claimed adsorption to occur.

In response, the Examiner notes that claim 9 is a product claim and reads as follows: "An implant consisting of a bioadaptable porous material on which an adenoviral or retroviral vector carrying a gene encoding an osteo-inducible transcription factor Cbfal is adsorbed." Applicant's arguments focus on the process how the implant being made requires a specified condition. However, the Examiner notes that the degassed reduced pressure condition is not recited in the claim. The Examiner maintains the position that Doll et al. anticipates the claimed invention because Doll et al. disclose beta-TCP, a bio-compatible biodegradable polymeric matrix, in the context of a pharmaceutical composition comprising a polynucleotide encoding Cbfal1, in a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier. It is noted that a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier reads on water. Considering a pharmaceutical composition comprises beta-TCP and a polynucleotide encoding Cbfal1 dissolved in water, the claimed adsorption process will inherently occur. Therefore, Doll et al. anticipate the claimed invention. Further information regarding product-by-process claims is provided below.

"Where, as here, the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product (*In re Ludtke*). Whether the rejection is based on "inherency" under 35 USC 102, on "prima facie obviousness" under 35 USC 103, jointly or alternatively, the burden of proof is the same, and its fairness is evidenced by the PTO's inability to manufacture products or to obtain and compare prior art products. *In re Best*, *Bolton*, and *Shaw*, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977) citing *In re Brown*, 59 CCPA 1036, 459 F.2d 531, 173 USPQ 685 (1972))."

"When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not." *In re Spada*, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Therefore, the prima facie case can be rebutted by evidence showing that the prior art products do not necessarily possess the characteristics of the claimed product. *In re Best*, 562 F.2d at 1255, 195 USPQ at 433. See also *Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner*, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985), *In re Ludtke*, 441 F.2d 660, 169 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1971), *Northam Warren Corp. v. D. F. Newfield Co.*, 7 F. Supp. 773, 22 USPQ 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1934.) See MPEP 2113 and MPEP 2112.01.

Even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process; determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." *In re Thorpe*, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

"The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. *In re Fessmann*, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. *In re Marosi*, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983).